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Extraterritorial Application of United States Antitrust Law: Problems for Canada-Recommendations for the United States and Canada*
by Donald L Baker**

T

HESE ARE TIMES of turmoil. Serious conflicts exist between Canada
and the United States over where and how American antitrust laws are to
be enforced. In fact, the conflict is broader than just Canada and the United
States: quite similar conflicts exist today between the United States and the
other leading common law nations, including Britain and Australia.
I speak here happily freed of the constraints of public office, and yet not
wholly freed from what I learned through the challenging experience of
holding office. Some of my views may seem outrageous to some people in
Canada. Other views may seem equally outrageous to some of my American
countrymen. So be it. A free university serves both its ideals and its society
well when it offers a forum for honest minds to exchange outrageous
ideas-and sometimes, through the process, to find a new truth which may
still seem outrageous to political apologists and other custodians of conventional wisdom.
These conflicts with which we deal are phrased in concepts of "jurisdiction," "extraterritoriality," "comity," "Crown privilege," etc. But they go
much deeper. They reflect differences in national politics, priorities, and
unspoken assumptions. To make progress, we must go behind the lawyers'
phrases to the broader realities.
I.

THE AMERICAN REALITY

Americans have many frontier virtues and at least some frontier faults.
We still have a strong sense of the worth of individual effort, and the value of
individual liberty. As a people, we have a solid distrust of government and a
deep lack of respect for those in authority.
Our antitrust law embodies these values. It reflects a feeling that the consumer will be better served if businesses have to, hustle to survive. In other
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words, as consumers, we tend to prefer the impersonal market to a paternalistic government as our protector. But antitrust law goes deeper. It embodies a populist suspicion of the big and distant enterprise and tries to curb
or break up visible private economic power. The Sherman Act therefore is
not a few dusty pages buried in our law libraries but, as the Supreme Court
put it, "the Magna Carta of free enterprise" in the United States. High school
history students read about Senator Sherman, Standard Oil, and the robber
barons. Congress may not have been too sure what it was doing in 1890, but
what it did has taken on an almost constitutional quality. Price fixing,
cartels, and the like are front page evils in the American environment.
Today, we are riding a particularly strong wave of public support of antitrust policies and enforcement. Politicians, encouraged by the press and
public, have sharpened the antitrust weapons greatly in the past five years.
First, United States antitrust enforcement budgets, already large by the standards of most industrial countries, have been increased some forty percent in
constant dollars, and almost 100% in inflated dollars. Second, broad new investigatory tools have been created to aid the enforcement agencies. Third,
state attorney generals have been authorized to bring large treble damage
suits on behalf of injured consumers. Fourth, maximum antitrust jail
sentences have been tripled, and maximum corporate fines have been increased
twentyfold. Fifth, resale price maintenance has been repealed. The
American political momentum is plainly for more and tougher antitrust enforcement. Antitrust enforcers are constantly asked why they are not doing
more to break up OPEC, to eliminate the Arab boycott of Israel, to bring
down energy costs, and so forth.
Americans also are afflicted with what might be called "the sunshine
ethic." Americans thoroughly distrust public officials, especially when they
are making vague claims about "national security," "public safety," or the
general good. We aspire to be "a government of laws, not of men." We want
government carried out by formal rules and orders, and we want it carried on
in the open. Thus, we vindicate the right of the press to print whatever it
has, while we narrowly limit the right of government to claim confidentiality
on what it has. I need only to remind you of the Pentagon Papers case, where
the Supreme Court flatly rejected the Pentagon's firm assertion of "national
security" as a ground for withholding public disclosure; and the unique case
captioned United States of America v. Richard M. Nixon, President of the
United States, in which the Supreme Court unanimously rejected the right of
our highest elected official to use an "executive privilege" to withhold
documents sought by the public prosecutor. It was for the courts, not the
President, to determine the privilege question.
The American "sunshine" tradition goes much beyond a few celebrated
cases. Our Freedom of Information Act allows members of the public to obtain access to nearly all internal government documents. Congress has just reemphasized the point by passing the Sunshine Act which requires various
government agencies to hold virtually all their deliberations in public. This
means, for example, that three members of the five member Civil
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Aeronautics Board cannot legally hold an informal discussion among
themselves on a question of airline policy.
I do not ask you to believe that all this emphasis on open markets and
open government is wise. I do ask you to believe that it is real, that it embodies some deeply-held American values.
II.

THE CANADIAN REALITY

I look at Canada with sympathy for the problems of maintaining peace,
order, and good government among diverse people sparsely spaced across a
vast continent and in the shadow of a large and energetic neighbor.
Much of what has happened in Canada is in reaction to disturbing
developments in the United States. Much of the settlement in the Maritime
Provinces was in reaction to the American Revolution. Much of the spirit of
the Charlottetown Conference was a reaction to the horrors of the American
Civil War: those there wanted what they thought to be a strong form of
federal government because they saw great dangers in weakness at the center
of a vast federation.
In the Twentieth Century-and particularly within recent decades- Canadians reacted in a variety of ways to the huge American role in the Canadian
economy. Canada decided.' to regulate foreign investment and attempted to
make foreign owned enterprises behave as if they were Canadian citizens
rather than outposts in some overseas commercial empire.
Canadians seem to have a more charitable view toward government than
American citizens do. Canadian government is directly involved in various
sensitive activities from which the United States Government is precluded, for
example, energy and transportation.
The Canadian confidence in government is reflected in its approach to
government secrecy. The Official Secrets Act, following the British tradition,
has a breadth and a scope which is hard for Americans to appreciate. Crown
privilege also has a breadth unfamiliar to Americans, and the Canadian
courts seem much less involved as an outside check on executive discretion
than are the United States courts.
There seems to be nothing in Canada that corresponds in strength and
breadth to the Jeffersonian populist tradition, which assumes "bigness is
badness" in the private sector. Thus, to take a striking example, Canada has
a nationwide commercial banking system dominated by a handful of very
large banks. The United States, by contrast, has a balkanized banking system
which confines bank operations to the borders of the specific state; consequently some of our largest banks, fenced in at home, do at least half their
business abroad. The Canadian tradition seems to be one of governmental
supervision and control of private economic power, rather than the more
structured nature of many antitrust and other public policies in the United
States.
In sum, antitrust in Canada is a technical legal matter for a small group
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of specialists. Accordingly, the Combines Investigation Act is limited in its
terms and has been enforced in a limited way.
III.

THE QUESTION OF JURISDICTION AND REALITY

I mention the above underlying political realities because they have so
much to do with today's "jurisdictional" conflicts. We have to be practical
rather than ideological.
There is of course a broader reality: Our age of modem technology and
industrialization makes our lives decidedly interdependent. In today's world,

something can physically occur in Canada which has a primary effect in the
United States; something can physically occur in the United States which may
have its primary effect in Canada. For example, if I set up a powerful
transmitter and started broadcasting from my hilltop in Ithaca, New York on
a frequency assigned to the CBC station in Toronto, the immediate physical
act would be in New York State, but the primary effect would be in Ontario
where most of the listeners on that frequency are located. Or, if someone
standing on the waterfront at Windsor fired a rifle across the Detroit River,
the physical act of firing would occur in Ontario but the primary impact
would occur in Michigan.
The same kind of thing can happen with economic activities, although
the chain of causation may be less visible. Moreover, government cooperation
may be much less effective when the harm is purely economic: the host
government may have little political incentive to help stop an activity which
produces harm in a neighboring jurisdiction while causing a profit at home.
We should bear these realities in mind as we deal with today's hard questions
of antitrust jurisdiction.
There are varied views on jurisdiction. At one extreme is the "pure territoriality" theory. Practically speaking, someone operating in one territory
(or perhaps on the high seas) can do whatever he wants, regardless of how
harmful it is to those in another territory, as long as it is not illegal where he
physically does it. With all due respect, this view is more suitable to the
simpler world of Queen Victoria than to our highly technological and interdependent world; and, in the economic realm, it tends to support private
"beggar your neighbor" undertakings.
At the other extreme is the "pure interventionism" theory which holds
that whatever is done in one state may be subjected to the jurisdiction of another
state if it has some, albeit small, impact there. This view is equally out moded.
It is appropriate for a world in which little activity flows back and forth
among nations and some great power takes upon itself the role of policing
trade and relationships among nations. It is inappropriate for the postimperial world, a world with a growing level of trade, travel, and investment
among nations, filled with touchy sensitivities about sovereignty.
The major countries of the world have to find, presumably at least in
part under the rubric of comity, some workable compromise between the
polar extremes of "pure territoriality" and "pure interventionism;" and to
make it work there must be greater cooperation in law enforcement.
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Antitrust offers a good place to look at this issue, especially where it deals
with tangible trade flows. Several of us at the Department of Justice (including most notably, Douglas Rosenthal, the Assistant Chief of the Antitrust
Division's Foreign Commerce Section) have talked publicly about this issue for
some time. We have suggested that the United States prosecutors should
assert jurisdiction only: (1) where a restraint has a substantial impact on
United States import trade; or (2) where a substantial and direct private
restraint exists on the export trade opportunities for firms operating in the
United States. The former is the more important category, because it is here
that the United States has a direct consumer interest. (However, this approach to jurisdiction has been criticized by some American lawyers as being
"too narrow" in terms of our history and jurisprudence.) It is the view stated
in the Justice Department's 1977 Antitrust Guide for International Operations. It also is in line with the modem view of jurisdiction and comity embodied in sectibn 40 of our own Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations
Law of the United States.
Of course this still leaves the question of "What is substantial?" This is
not a new question for antitrust lawyers, since much antitrust jurisprudence
turns on notions of substantiality. It seems to be clear that a price fix carried
out in an international market in which American purchasers buy eighty percent of the supply involves a substantial impact on American commerce. Conversely, the same price fix in a broad market in which American purchasers
account for less than ten percent of the market probably does not involve any
"substantial" impact on American commerce. In the latter case, it would
plainly be wise for the United States-or any other nation similarly
situated-to refrain from seeking to exercise jurisdiction. This would be
especially clear where the other ninety percent of sales were to customers
within the territory (or territories) where the cartelizing took place and the
government (or governments) there formally supported the cartel.
This test of substantiality opens up the possibility that at least two
antitrust-minded nations may assert jurisdiction. For example, suppose a
private producers' cartel covers some important raw material, forty percent of
which is sold in the United States and forty percent of which is sold in the
European Community. Both would indeed have a "substantial" interest and
both would properly be able to enforce their antitrust laws against it. This
situation is not essentially different from how we would deal with piracy. If a
conspiracy were formed to practice piracy on the ships or planes of the
United States and the European Community, both could and would exercise
jurisdiction. In fact, this is what was done with the famous Quinine cartel,
where both the United States Justice Department and the European Community's Commission proceeded against the quinine producers for price fixing
(in that case "substantiality" was seen not only in a significant volume of sales
to American buyers, but in the defendants' efforts to manipulate the
American government's disposition of its surplus stockpile so as to insure that
the overseas cartel would not be disrupted by "excess supply").
Thus, a government can and should exercise antitrust jurisdiction over
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restraints practiced abroad, by people subject to personal jurisdiction, where
the restraint has a substantial impact on sales at home. "Substantiality" can
be measured in terms of sales that actually have taken place, or which would
have likely taken place absent the restraint. Determining whether a restraint
has a "substantial" impact may not be easy; but it is more realistic than applying either "pure territoriality" or "pure interventionism" as a basis for
jurisdiction.

IV.

ANTICOMPETITIVE ROLES OF GOVERNMENT

Jurisdiction is not the only subject in which we need a new spirit of
pragmatic accommodation. Government involvement in cartel activities also is
a prime concern.
Governments can carry out, encourage, order or wink at cartel activities
in a variety of different ways, although a government interest or involvement
does not of itself end the antitrust inquiry. In 1927, the United States
Supreme Court held in the Sisal Sales case that foreign government legislation
passed at the instigation of the cartelizers, to help and implement a cartel,
did not afford United States antitrust immunity.
We see this issue developed more fully within the American federal
system. State and local governments support, and at times even implement,
restraints on competition contrary to the federal interest in antitrust enforcement and interstate trade. There have been a considerable number of antitrust cases (often private ones) arising out of such state activities. A rule has
emerged that when private parties engage in a restraint on competition that
the state as sovereign has commanded, then these private parties as involuntary actors, are exempt from the antitrust laws. However, where the state
merely authorized the private parties to engage in the restraints, and they
voluntarily chose to do so, no antitrust immunity is necessarily present.
Similarly, informal encouragement by public officals does not provide the
basis for antitrust immunity. Again the key, voluntary choice, belongs to the
private parties who actually impose the restraint. The leading American case
on price fixing involves successful Justice Department prosecution of a
gasoline price stabilization scheme which Department of Interior officials informally encouraged during the Great Depression. The Supreme Court said,
in Socony- Vacuum Oil Co., that to allow as a defense such informal prompting would be to put the effective administration of the antitrust laws into the
hands of "virtual volunteers." Sometimes government officials may even be
regarded as co-conspirators in the private scheme, especially when the officials are acting beyond their legal duties.
Liability can also occur where a sovereign formally delegates its power to
some private firm or group and makes it a self-regulator or "a state agency
for limited purposes." This sovereign delegation may be a sine qua non to
any restraint, but it is still the private party who chooses how to exercise the
power. If the private party has a pecuniary interest in how the power is exercised, then it probably cannot hide behind the state's sovereignty. As a practical matter, the issue comes up most often when the state delegates power to
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some self-regulatory organization (e.g., a professional association) which in
turn uses its power to exclude competition.
The newest question in this area is whether "commercial" activities
undertaken by a government are subject to the antitrust laws? This is a question of growing practical importance as governments take on more and more
functions that had been performed traditionally in the private sector (e.g.,
running transportation terminals, mass transit, and sports stadiums). The
Supreme Court faced this issue in Louisiana Power & Light Co., where the
question was whether a city-run electric light system, authorized by state law,
is subject to antitrust laws. The Court held that the federal antitrust laws
could be applied to such "commercial" activities carried out by
municipalities. A somewhat analogous issue came up several years ago in
which a closely-divided Supreme Court held that a foreign sovereign could
not plead sovereign immunity as a defense to a claim arising out of a "commercial" transaction between the parties-a position which has been
strengthened in the recent United States legislation on sovereign immunity.
This is significant, for it suggests that a decision applying antitrust law to
states and local "commercial" undertakings is likely to be extended to at least
the "commercial" undertakings of foreign states operating in the United
States (e.g., state owned transportation companies). If the antitrust laws are
to be applied to the "commercial" activities of governments, many hard questions will arise as to what activity is really "commercial" and what is
"sovereign" or "political." Where a foreign state's enterprise is involved, comity would dictate that the United States must pay some attention to the law
and politics of the foreign state.
Apparently, it is not enough that the "government" is vaguely interested
in some particular scheme of things. For antitrust purposes, the decisive questions will be: (1) what is the government's role, interest and power?; and (2)
precisely how did the government carry out its role? All this may seem
technical, but it should be viewed in the context of America's historic goal
"to have a government of laws, not men" and its more formalized approach
to public administration.
Perhaps, out of a spirit of comity, the United States ought to apply a different rule with respect to foreign governments indicating that so long as
there is some "governmental" interest, the scheme ought to be exempt from
the United States antitrust laws. Foreign governments often act informally
and with broad discretion and thus even a very informal bureaucratic suggestion may be tantamount to an order. The businessman might ignore the suggestion this time, but the next time he needs approval from the same ministry
or department he may have difficulties.
There is some merit to this suggestion, however, it goes too far. Suppose,
for example, that the world's producers of some energy source want to increase the price. Perhaps they go to the United States Secretary of Energy
and ask him what he thinks about forming some sort of producers' cartel to
"stabilize" the prices and hopefully increase the predictability of supply. The
Secretary agrees that such stabilization would be a fine idea because "higher
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prices should produce more exploration." Now the same producers go to the
Minister of Energy in each of the other major supplying nations, and each
time they get the same answer: "It would be a fine idea and it also will help
our balance of payments." Yet the American Secretary's informal blessing
and encouragement is absolutely no defense under United States antitrust
law. The producer is a "virtual volunteer." If we reach the opposite result for
the equally informal blessing of the Canadian or French Minister of Energy,
then we are left with an anomalous result (which, incidentally, is quite unacceptable politically within the United States). Diplomacy and comity may dictate that there be some flexibility in how the United States treats foreign
government involvement in anticompetitive behavior, but this cannot mean
accepting purely informal bureaucratic encouragement as a defense to a
substantial private trade restraint.
Assume a foreign government is in fact the moving party and wants to
"stabilize" prices and production in a key industry. The government can do
this and assure no United States antitrust violation. But what this requires is
that it play the dominant role and essentially eliminate private discretion.
The foreign government, alone or in conjunction with other governments,
must carry out or mandate the cartel actions. Then there is no United States
antitrust liability, regardless of how substantial the impact is on American
consumers. This is what the OPEC experience shows; for these governments
themselves are openly operating the most effective cartel in the history of the
world. Any private activity is essentially involuntary or non-existent; and the
truly sovereign, political activities are beyond the effective reach of the
United States courts for antitrust or any other purposes. The question turns
on sovereign immunity.
The antitrust result is the same where the foreign state formally commands a private enterprise to do something abroad which directly affects the
United States market. For example, suppose that an energy producing country commands its subjects, by statute or order in council, not to export the
particular product at less than so many dollars a ton. The energy producer,
who sells to American buyers at the state mandated minimum price level,
engages in no antitrust violation even if the minimum price is intended to
prop up the cartel of which that producer was a member. This issue has
recurred in the Arab boycott context, where Arab governments have compelled
firms not to land supplies identified as having been procured from a

"blacklisted" source.
That is the unusual case. More often, a cartel involves "a blend of public

and private decision-making." In such circumstances, the private party can
and should be held liable for its anticompetitive initiatives. Where a foreign

government formally approves a cartel, then this may sometimes suggest that
some basic state policy lies behind the cartel. In the interest of comity, a

United States court may want to ask how important the impact is on the
United States. When the approved restraint has its major impact on the
American market, and especially when this is the intended purpose, it is still
appropriate to exercise United States antitrust jurisdiction over the private
parties for their role in the scheme.
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Many countries, including the United States, formally authorize export
cartels and provide statutory immunity from their own laws. This is done for
obviously mercantilist reasons. It is understandable in the context of a world
in which national governments tend to be champions of producer interest
within their borders.
However, the fact that the United States authorized producer export
cartels and guarantees them immunity from American antitrust laws is no
reason why consumer nations should not prosecute the same cartels under
their own antitrust laws. Nations are entitled to be champions of consumer
interests; and, provided they do it evenhandedly with due process, the
United States really has no basis for complaint. Our Congress does not have
the power and has never thought that it had the power to hand out immunities from the Combines Investigations Act, or the Treaty of Rome. The
Parliament in Ottawa or the European Commission in Brussels also has no
power to hand out general exemptions from our Sherman Act for private
cartels.
All of this is salutory as a matter of practical politics. Consumers in the
world are entitled to look to their governments to protect their interest-for
only the government with such a consumer stake is likely to have the political
incentive to enforce antitrust laws effectively. If we deny that power because
of quaint jurisdictional notions or just plain timidity, then consumer interests
are in fact likely to be lost to producer protectionism. It simply will be a little
easier to "beggar your neighbor" than it already is.
V.

COOPERATION OR CONFLICT IN ENFORCEMENT?

Much more effective cooperation among governments on these antitrust
enforcement issues is needed. As nations, Canada and the United States are
both producers and consumers. If they are to protect their consumer interests, cooperation is essential. The Executive Agreement between the United
States and the Federal Republic of Germany offers a good example of what
can be done. Each of the parties has a substantial antitrust enforcement
mechanism in place, and both have vigorously enforced antitrust laws within
their own borders. The Agreement promises extensive cooperation in securing
documents and other relevant information from parties under investigation
which conduct activities in the other's territory. This is vitally important, for
if antitrust prosecution is to be evenhanded and fair it must be based on
reasonable access to relevant facts. The United States-German Agreement is a
long step in that direction.
What is happening in the English-speaking world (perhaps more accurately described as the English-French-Afrikaans-speaking world) is far less
encouraging. There are a growing number of statutes and orders in council
designed specifically to thwart antitrust investigations by any friendly foreign
power. It all began in the 1950's with Ontario and Quebec "business records"
legislation passed in response to an American antitrust investigation of the
paper industry. It gained momentum with the British Shipping Contracts and
Commercial Documents Act of 1964, designed to thwart Federal Maritime
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Commission investigations. It reached full maturity with the special restrictions by Canada, Australia, South Africa and France designed to bar United
States investigation of the alleged uranium cartel.
The irony of all this is particularly apparent in the context of the 1964
British Shipping Act. Shipping, like air travel, necessarily involves cooperation between the sovereigns at the ends of the routes. In this area both
Britain and the United States accept a shipping conference system-but with
important differences. The American Shipping Act makes clear that antitrust
immunity is only for those conference arrangements regulated and approved
by our Federal Maritime Commission. The British do not purport to regulate
conference activity, instead they leave this to the shipping lines. This "hands
off" policy runs fundamentally into the American (or the Adam Smith) ethic:
We simply do not leave self-serving private commercial enterprises free to
restrain whatever they wish. Rather, under the American scheme, the antitrust laws apply as a barrier to cartel behavior unless some other government's scheme is put in their place as a safeguard. The British fundamentally
object to anybody regulating their ships. However, if one power mandates
what the other power prohibits, there is no trade. There is nothing
outrageous about the United States saying that those who haul cargo to our
ports will have to meet our Shipping Act and antitrust requirements for protecting competition.
What is disturbing about these "business records" laws is that they are
being used to prevent the United States from even looking at whether what it
regards as violations of its laws may have even taken place. The result is
outrage and frustration in the United States. It also is likely to result in more
haphazard and uneven law enforcement. The present environment will put
great pressure on the Department of Justice to bring cases based on less
evidence, simply because it will have to act on what it infers from the possibly
distorted fragments of evidence it has. Defendants will be similarly prejudiced-the same laws may prevent them from producing any clarifying or
exculpatory evidence that might otherwise be available. As a result, trials
may be shorter but decisions less just.
The depth and the complexity in this whole issue is clear from the "Great
Uranium Saga." A few years ago, Westinghouse Electric Corporation sold
uranium that it did not have to a number of American utilities. When the
price of uranium skyrocketed from about five dollars a pound to approximately forty dollars a pound, Westinghouse refused to perform these contracts on grounds of "commercial impracticability." The utilities sued and
most of their cases were consolidated in Richmond, Virginia. Among other
things, Westinghouse argued in its defense that the emergence of the
uranium producers' "club" was not something that it could have reasonably
foreseen. In due course, the district judge in Richmond issued letters rogatory
to the High Court in London, asking for oral testimony and documents from
the senior officials of Rio Tinto Zinc, Ltd., allegedly a leading member of the
"club." The letters rogatory were issued pursuant to a treaty with and statute
in England covering civil litigation. The British executives and Rio Tinto
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strenuously objected to such discovery. They argued that their testimony
might incriminate them under the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and subject them to penalties under the Treaty of Rome antitrust regulations. The English Court of Appeals allowed the company to
withhold the documents because of its potential exposure to penalties under
the European Community regulations, and held that the Fifth Amendment
(which only applied to individuals) was a question for the American court.
The United States district judge, sitting in London, then ruled in favor of the
Fifth Amendment privilege. Thereafter, Westinghouse prevailed on the
Department of Justice to issue what amounted to an immunity order to compel testimony in the private case. In explaining its unusual course, the
Department stressed that it was not acting on Westinghouse's behalf but
rather it wanted immunity because the Westinghouse depositions offered the
only reasonable prospect for the government to obtain testimony from these
Rio Tinto officials for grand jury use.
Exposed individuals do not resist immunity orders-yet this is exactly
what the Britons did, first in the District Court in Richmond and then back
in the Courts of Justice in England. They argued that to allow the Department of Justice to indirectly obtain this testimony was a perversion of the
treaty and the statute and contrary to the interests of Great Britain. In effect,
they were arguing that any evidence that was likely to fall into the hands of
the Department of Justice should be barred from private litigants with a
legitimate right under the treaty. Rio Tinto was supported by counsel for the
British Attorney General, who argued that there was a state interest in nondisclosure. The English Court of Appeals responded that this was not a proper way to exercise Crown privilege and that the Rio Tinto officials should
answer the questions at the depositions, under the grant of immunity. They
have not done so. The House of Lords has stayed the proceedings and will
hear the case shortly. This saga reveals how determined the members of the
uranium "club" are to prevent evidence from falling into the hands of
American prosecutors. England has become such a key forum for the very
practical reason that it is the only "club" member which has not erected a
general barrier against United States discovery of uranium documents.
VI.

SOME PRAGMATIC SUGGESTIONS

It is important that Canada and the United States try to work their way
out of the complex situation in which they find themselves. There are some
pragmatic steps that can be taken.
A.

PracticalAdvice to the United States
I recommend that the United States do the following:
(1)

Make it clear and certain that United States enforcement
agencies do not pursue a "pure interventionist" position on
antitrust jurisdiction. They should be sensitive towards an
"interventionist" reach of the type which covers many foreign
mergers which are likely to have merely a modest impact on
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American markets. The Department of Justice, as amicus,
should urge a more limited view (such as a "substantial
impact" test) on United States courts, in private antitrust
cases.
(2) Recognize that the grand jury has a lingering "star chamber"
image among many people abroad. Thus, the Department of
Justice should use the grand jury to investigate possible
violations by overseas parties only when it seems more
probable than not that a criminal indictment will be likely
to result. This is narrower than the Department's normal
standard for authorizing a grand jury investigation-which is to
proceed with the grand jury when a reasonable possibility
exists that an investigation may result in criminal liability.
Under my proposal, the Department would use its broad new
civil powers and proceed by civil investigation. If after a
civil investigation, the Department finds that a criminal violation is present, then it can still obtain an indictment by
presenting the evidence again to the grand jury.
(3) Be sensitive and restrained in using inflammatory "criminal"
law enforcement tools, such as border watches. These tend to
cause considerable consternation in Canada out of proportion
to what they achieve.
(4) Recognize that other countries' systems of administration are
often less formal than their American counterparts. We should
look at least in part to the foreign state's normal practice
in dealing with the issue of whether the foreign state as
sovereign has in fact "commanded" or "formally approved" any
anticompetitive conduct under investigation.
(5) Recognize formal approval by a foreign government as a basis
for United States antitrust immunity where: (a) the major foreign
state policy is at stake; and (b) the primary target or impact
of the anticompetitive action is not the American import
market.
(6) Do not treat informal encouragement by foreign officials as the
basis for antitrust immunity, nor charge such foreign officials as
co-conspirators on the basis of such encouragement. When
domestic government officials are involved, they can be more
easily assumed to have some knowledge of United States antitrust laws; and it is less alarming to allow them to be charged
as co-conspirators when they plainly exceed their official duties.
Doing so with foreign officials causes great public consternation
and little, if any, gain to American antitrust enforcement.
(7) Apply United States antitrust laws to "commercial" enterprises,
owned by foreign sovereigns, where such foreign enterprises
operate in the United States or between the United States and
foreign places. Out of comity, the United States should not
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(8)

(9)
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apply its antitrust laws to commercial activities by foreign
state enterprises carried on overseas, unless the primary target
or impact of such activity is in the American market. In other
words, the United States should treat foreign state enterprises
as engaged in conduct involving important state policies, as mentioned in paragraph (5) above.
Eliminate overlapping antitrust enforcement jurisdiction between the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of
Justice in the international trade area. The "independent"
commission (of which the Federal Trade Commission is one) is
hard for foreigners to understand, especially when it is out of
the day-to-day control of those responsible for the foreign policy
of the United States. By contrast, in the airline field, international orders of the "independent" Civil Aeronautics Board
are subject to review and being set aside by the President.
Antitrust can be diplomatically sensitive. Therefore, it is highly
desirable to leave antitrust enforcement in the hands of an
executive agency directly responsible to the President, who is in
turn responsible for conducting foreign policy. Most United
States international antitrust enforcement is already being done
by the Department of Justice. Formalizing this role would nevertheless eliminate lingering uncertainties in the private sector.
Realize that protectionism invites cartelization as a response.
Therefore, the Attorney General and the Antitrust Division, as
champions of competitive policy, should take an even more active role in analyzing, and when appropriate, opposing measures
offered by other parts of the government to protect parts of
the American economy from international competition. The
newspaper stories make clear that the foreign government interest in the uranium cartel-which is very much at the heart
of today's problems-was spurred by protectionist uranium
policies and embargoes mandated by the United States Congress
and the United States Atomic Energy Commission.

PracticalAdvice to Canada
I would recommend that Canada do the following things:
(1)

(2)

Canada should be more consumer-minded and investigate the
extraterritorial aspects of dealing with foreign arrangements
which have a substantial impact on Canada. This is well within
the bounds of modern international law and is a sensible
political course for a government dedicated to protecting its
consumers.
To that end, prosecute United States Webb-Pomerene associations whose activities have a substantial adverse impact on Canadian markets. In other words, put the United States to the test:
Does it really believe in extraterritoriality?

1979]
(3)

(4)

(5)

C.

EXTRA TERRITORIAL ANTITRUST CONFERENCE
If you are going to cartelize, follow the Arab example. Have
the government carry on the cartel activities openly and clearly
while exercising central responsibility. This has the competitive
virtue of putting the government squarely on the line
politically, thereby giving its own media and consuming public
an opportunity to be heard on these subjects.
Whenever the government seeks to get private firms to cartelize
in a field where the United States is a substantial buyer, use
formal government powers. It is much better to exercise formal
powers at the outset than to prevent investigation after the
event.
Be more sensitive and selective in dealing with the document
discovery issue. It is one thing for the Canadian government
to say that it needs to screen documents before they go abroad,
to make sure that there is no sensitive state interest at stake.
It is an entirely different thing to erect a total bar of all
private documents. That looks unduly familiar-and unnecessarily abrasive-to a neighboring country which has just
been through the Watergate saga and whose press and public
are extraordinarily suspicious of bureaucratic "coverups" at high
levels in government.

Practical Advice to Both Countries
We should remember the common values which unite us. We both
have a fundamental commitment to democratic government under
law. We both have a common interest in producer efficiency and
consumer welfare. In the long run, we both have very strong interests
in the effective working of the markets in the North American continent. Cooperation in making these markets work and in antitrust enforcement is greatly to be preferred to competition in erecting special
interest barriers and cartels. We have too much in common-and too
much at stake-not to try harder to do better.

